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Summary 
This paper provides a one-year forward-looking analysis of a revenue countercyclical farm 
program. The basis for the revenue countercyclical farm program originates from the National 
Corn Growers Association’s (NCGA) farm bill proposal. We explore several options under this 
program. The options consist of various crop loan rate levels for corn and soybeans. The amount 
and distribution of payments to producers under the various NCGA options and the Agricultural 
Act of 2001 (House Resolution 2646) are examined and compared against expected payments 
under the current array of farm programs.
  
 
 
EFFECTS OF ADDING A TARGET REVENUE PROGRAM  
AND SOYBEAN FIXED DECOUPLED PAYMENTS TO 
 CURRENT FARM PROGRAMS 
 
 
Introduction 
TWO YEARS AGO we conducted an analy-
sis of Congressman Charles Stenholm’s (D-
Texas) Supplemental Income Payments for 
Producers (SIPP) proposal (http://www.card. 
iastate.edu/ publications/texts/ 9bp28_    
revised.pdf). The idea of SIPP was to increase 
payments when farm income was low, in 
contrast to fixed decoupled payments that arrive 
without regard to farm income levels. The 
Stenholm idea of a countercyclical payment 
program has caught on with others in Congress 
and with commodity organizations as they look 
ahead to a new farm bill. A new countercyclical 
payment program was part of the Agricultural 
Act of 2001 (H.R. 2646) that was passed by the 
House agriculture committee in August. The 
Senate agriculture committee soon will be 
looking at proposals that include countercyclical 
payment programs. Given this level of interest, 
it seems likely that the new farm bill will 
contain a new program that increases payments 
when income is low.  
 
In our original analysis, we assumed 
that soybeans would become a new program 
crop. Justification for this assumption is that 
soybean producers received billions of 
dollars in marketing loan gains and loan 
deficiency payments (LDPs) under the 1996 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform (FAIR) Act. Nearly all new farm bill 
proposals also include soybeans as a new 
program crop. Inclusion of soybeans in a 
new farm bill that eliminates all past pro-
grams is relatively straightforward, as was 
demonstrated in our analysis of SIPP. But 
most of today’s proposals envision adding a 
new countercyclical payment program on top 
of existing production flexibility contract 
(PFC) payments (also known as fixed 
decoupled payments) and non-recourse 
loans. Soybean producers currently have 
access to non-recourse loans, but they do not 
receive PFC payments. If soybeans are to 
become a regular program crop, then a PFC 
payment rate and base acreage levels must be 
established. H.R. 2646 did both, establishing 
a PFC payment rate of $0.42 per bushel. In 
conjunction with this additional benefit, the 
soybean loan rate was decreased from $5.26 
per bushel to $4.92 per bushel.  
 
Adding a countercyclical program on top 
of existing marketing loan programs increases 
the complexity of the analysis and makes it 
more difficult to interpret results. If LDPs count 
as market revenue, then countercyclical 
payments will decrease when LDPs increase. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend our earlier 
analysis in order to more fully understand the 
trade-offs when both a countercyclical program 
and non-recourse loans are in operation. 
 
To give more structure to this analysis, we 
base our countercyclical payment program on 
the National Corn Growers Association’s 
(NCGA) farm bill proposal. The original NCGA 
proposal did away with non-recourse loans, so 
we modify their proposal by adding marketing 
loan gains into their definition of market 
revenues. The following section gives the exact 
details of the program that we analyze.  
 
Our original SIPP analysis estimated 
what SIPP would have paid out had it been 
in existence from 1977 to 1999. This new 
analysis estimates what the payments would 
be for the first crop year that the program is 
in existence. That is, we conduct a forward-
looking analysis rather than a historical 
analysis. Because we do not know what 
prices and yields are going to be, the analysis 
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necessarily uses stochastic simulation 
methods in that we estimate the expected 
level of payments and the probability 
distribution of payments. In this way, we can 
estimate by crop the probability that pay-
ments will exceed any given level for all 
eight program crops.  
 
In the following section, we outline the 
policy options analyzed and the assumptions 
and methods used in the analysis. Then we 
present and discuss the results.  
 
Policies, Program Parameters,    
and Methodology 
The Countercyclical Program 
We take the NCGA countercyclical pro-
posal (see pp. 689–705 of The Future of 
Federal Farm Commodity Programs, Serial No. 
107-2, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2001) as the starting point of 
this analysis. The NCGA proposal would pay 
farmers with established base acres of a crop the 
difference between national target income for 
the crop and national actual income, which are 
defined as follows: 
 
National Target Income = 
[(Total Crop Market Income from 1996 to 
2000  
+ Total Marketing Loan Benefits from 
1996 to 2000  
+ Total Market Loss Assistance Payments 
from 1996 to 2000)¸ 5] 
× (adjustment factor) 
 
National Actual Income =  
Annual Crop Production  
× 3-month USDA market price 
 
The adjustment factor in National Target 
Income is the ratio of projected (by the Con-
gressional Budget Office [CBO]) production to 
average production from 1996 to 2000. The 
adjustment factor is used to make sure that 
departures from historic planted acreages and 
yields are reflected in target income. 
 
Because we want to understand the trade-
offs that would be made between marketing 
loan benefits and the NCGA proposal, we need 
to modify the NCGA definition of National 
Actual Income by adding marketing loan 
benefits. Thus, farmers would not be paid twice 
when prices fall below the loan rate for a crop. 
 
Payments to producers would be based on 
their base yield and base acres, which would 
reflect producers’ average acreage and yields 
from 1996 to 2000. Any revenue shortfall would 
be divided by national base production (national 
base acreage times national average yield) to 
determine the shortfall per unit. Then producer 
payments would equal their individual base 
production times this per unit shortfall. 
 
Table 1 provides the components of target 
revenue for each of the program crops from 
1996 to 2000. The values of production, 
marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, 
and market loss assistance payments are 
summed for each year; then the sum across the 
five-year period is averaged in the final column. 
 
Table 2 provides the components needed to 
calculate the adjustment factor. We assume that 
the first year of the program would be 2002. As 
shown, the CBO projection of soybean produc-
tion is 12 percent greater than the average 
production levels from 1996 to 2000, which 
reflects the large increase in soybean acres in 
recent years. 
 
Table 3 provides the unadjusted and ad-
justed National Target Income Levels for 2002. 
A quick comparison of the Table 3 income 
levels with the value of production reported in 
Table 1 shows that National Target Income 
exceeds the market value of production for most 
years. For barley, corn, sorghum, and wheat, the 
market value exceeds target income in one year 
out of five. For cotton, oats, and soybeans, the 
market value exceeds target income two years 
out of five. And the value of  rice production 
never exceeds the value of income. This 
suggests that the target income is quite high 
relative to the historic value of production. 
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TABLE 1. Components used to calculate National Target Revenue (in thousand dollars) 
Crop Year 
Value of  
Production 
Marketing Loan  
Payments 
Market Loss 
Assistance Payments 
Total 
Returns Average 
Barley 1996 1,080,940 0 0 1,080,940  
  1997 861,620 2,072 0 863,692  
  1998 686,517 82,683 59,089 828,288  
  1999 597,038 38,402 114,672 750,112  
  2000 632,098 68,815 113,678 814,591 867,525 
Corn 1996 25,149,013 0 0 25,149,013  
  1997 22,351,507 97,886 0 22,449,393  
  1998 18,922,084 1,387,087 1,307,578 21,616,749  
  1999 17,103,991 2,405,838 2,543,804 22,053,633  
  2000 18,621,160 2,557,370 2,542,107 23,720,636 22,997,885 
Cotton 1996 6,136,592 0 0 6,136,592  
  1997 5,708,940 28,841 0 5,737,781  
  1998 3,923,827 562,830 316,229 4,802,886  
  1999 3,533,825 1,547,158 613,251 5,694,234  
  2000 4,597,962 414,740 611,375 5,624,077 5,599,114 
Oats 1996 313,910 0 0 313,910  
  1997 273,284 71 0 273,355  
  1998 199,748 19,608 4,236 223,592  
  1999 169,576 28,453 8,407 206,436  
  2000 164,555 44,485 8,303 217,343 246,927 
Rice 1996 1,690,270 0 0 1,690,270  
  1997 1,756,136 0 0 1,756,136  
  1998 1,654,157 14,120 237,960 1,906,237  
  1999 1,230,257 401,398 464,544 2,096,199  
  2000 1,072,791 582,997 463,263 2,119,051 1,913,579 
Sorghum 1996 1,986,316 0 0 1,986,316  
  1997 1,408,909 1,120 0 1,410,029  
  1998 905,468 61,150 141,532 1,108,150  
  1999 937,406 152,631 276,556 1,366,593  
  2000 822,598 82,653 275,649 1,180,900 1,410,397 
Soybeans 1996 17,439,971 0 0 17,439,971  
  1997 17,372,628 15,794 0 17,388,422  
  1998 13,493,891 1,223,226 0 14,717,117  
  1999 12,205,352 2,326,995 475,000 15,007,347  
  2000 13,073,497 2,521,115 500,000 16,094,612 16,129,494 
Wheat 1996 9,782,238 0 0 9,782,238  
  1997 8,286,741 15,693 0 8,302,434  
  1998 6,780,623 477,485 744,677 8,002,785  
  1999 5,593,989 937,699 1,445,038 7,976,726  
  2000 5,970,197 834,083 1,442,698 8,246,978 8,462,232 
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TABLE 2. Calculating the adjustment factor 
 
1996-2000 Average 
Production 
CBO 2002 Preliminary 
Production Estimate Adjustment 
Crop (million yield units) Factor 
Barley 341 319 0.94 
Corn 9,519 9,784 1.03 
Cotton 17 18 1.06 
Oats 156 141 0.90 
Rice 187 197 1.05 
Sorghum 603 588 0.98 
Soybeans 2,647 2,952 1.12 
Wheat 2,366 2,225 0.94 
 
 
TABLE 3. National target income levels 
 National Target Income 
 Unadjusted Adjusted  Unadjusted Adjusted 
Crop (million $) Crop (million $) 
Barley 868 813 Rice 1,914 2,013 
Corn 22,998 23,637 Sorghum 1,410 1,376 
Cotton 5,599 5,916 Soybeans 16,129 17,990 
Oats 247 223 Wheat 8,462 7,959 
 
 
 
Loan Rates 
We keep loan rates for all program 
crops except corn and soybeans constant. We 
evaluate different combinations of corn and 
soybean loan rates to show the trade-offs 
involved between countercyclical payments 
and marketing loan gains. We examine six 
corn and soybean loan rate combinations as 
shown in Table 4. Each of the scenarios we 
examine includes the modified NCGA 
countercyclical program as earlier defined. 
 
In addition to the loan rate scenarios in Ta-
ble 4, we also observe the budget impacts of the 
creation of the soybean PFC rate. We examine 
three soybean PFC rates: $0.15, $0.42, and 
$0.55 per bushel. Base acreage and yields for 
soybean PFC payments are equal to the 1996 to 
2000 average levels. 
 
 
Stochastic Methods  
Because future prices and yields cannot be 
known with certainty, forward-looking analyses 
can be used to assume a certain level of prices  
 
and yields, which would result in predetermined 
results, or future prices and yields can be treated 
as random variables that follow specified 
probability distributions. We use the second 
method where prices are distributed lognor-
mally and national crop yields follow a beta 
distribution.  
 
The parameters of the lognormal distribu-
tions are defined by setting the mean price equal 
to the 2002 projected Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) farm price, 
and the price volatility is set equal to 25 percent. 
The parameters of the beta distribution are 
found by setting the mode equal to the 2002 
projected FAPRI yield. The minimum yield is 
set equal to 80 percent of the observed mini-
mum yield taken from adjusted (for trend) 
yields from 1956 to 2000, and the maximum 
yield is set equal to 110 percent of the maxi-
mum yield taken from adjusted (for trend) 
yields from 1956 to 2000. All correlations 
between national yields of the program crops, 
prices of the  program crops,and yields and 
prices are set equal to their historical values 
from 1975 to 2000.
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TABLE 4. Loan rates under the alternative scenarios  
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 Alt. 6 
House 
Proposal 
Crop ($ per yield unit) 
Corn 1.89 1.89 1.89 2.10 2.04 1.97 1.89 
Soybean 5.26 5.10 4.92 5.26 5.10 4.92 4.92 
Barley 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.65 
Cotton 0.5192 0.5192 0.5192 0.5192 0.5192 0.5192 0.5192 
Oats 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.21 
Rice 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 
Sorghum 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.89 
Wheat 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.58 
 
 
Yields and prices are simulated by taking 
10,000 random draws from the specified 
distributions. That is, 10,000 corn prices and 
10,000 corn yields are drawn. This allows us to 
estimate the probability distribution of crop 
revenue for each program crop. In essence, this 
procedure allows us to repeat the 2002 crop year 
10,000 times. 
 
Key Assumptions 
Planted acreage and expected price lev-
els are held constant across all alternative 
scenarios. We recognize that acreage levels 
will likely respond somewhat to the incen-
tives embodied in the different scenarios. For 
example, a higher soybean loan rate will 
likely lead to higher soybean acreage, lower 
market prices, and higher loan deficiency 
payments. But our attention is on the differ-
ence in total payment levels, so we hold 
acreage and market prices constant. 
 
Results 
Table 5 shows the main results of the 
analysis. The results are the expected change in 
payments (the average change over the 10,000 
draws) from the new countercyclical program 
and marketing loan gains relative to the ex-
pected marketing loan gains that would be 
obtained under current farm policy. We provide 
the various corn and soybean loan rates that 
define the alternative scenarios in Table 6 (a 
reduced version of Table 4).  
 
 
The results show that all crops would 
gain from this proposal except for cotton 
and rice. The biggest gains would accrue to 
soybean producers. This large gain comes 
about because the soybean target revenue 
level under the alternatives implicitly gives 
a much higher level of support than the 
soybean target price in the House bill. To 
see this, note that the implicit target price 
for the revenue countercyclical program can 
be obtained by dividing the National Target 
Revenue from Table 1 by the 1996–2000 
average production reported in Table 2. This 
results in a price of $6.80, which is 16 
percent higher than the $5.86 target price in 
the House bill. The other seven program 
crops have target prices in the House bill 
that are equal to or greater than the implicit 
target price for the revenue countercyclical 
program. 
 
For soybeans, the response of payments to 
the alternative loan rates is generally quite low. 
The reason for a lack of response is simple: in 
most price-yield situations, there is a dollar-for-
dollar trade-off between countercyclical 
payments and marketing loan payments 
(marketing loan gains and LDPs). Recall that all 
marketing loan payments are added to market 
revenue in the determination of countercyclical 
payments. Only when the countercyclical 
payment is zero and price is below loan rate will 
an increase in loan rates result in an increase in 
payments. This situation occurs only if market-
ing loan payments are so large that their 
addition to market revenue exceeds target  
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TABLE 5. The change in expected payments relative to current farm policy 
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 Alt. 6 
House 
Proposal  
Crop (million $) 
Barley 118 118 118 118 118 118 47 
Corn 2,896 2,896 2,896 3,038 2,962 2,913 2,621 
Cotton 966 966 966 966 966 966 976 
Oats 59 59 59 59 59 59 39 
Rice 230 230 230 230 230 230 303 
Sorghum 324 324 324 324 324 324 166 
Soybeans 2,741 2,717 2,712 2,741 2,717 2,712 803 
Wheat 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,207 
Total 8,784 8,760 8,755 8,926 8,826 8,772 6,162 
 
 
TABLE 6. Corn and soybean loan rates under the alternative scenarios  
 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 Alt. 6 
House 
Proposal 
Crop ($ per bushel) 
Corn 1.89 1.89 1.89 2.10 2.04 1.97 1.89 
Soybeans 5.26 5.10 4.92 5.26 5.10 4.92 4.92 
 
 
revenue. When a dollar-for-dollar trade-off 
occurs, the marketing loan program and the 
countercyclical program duplicate each other in 
the sense that elimination of the marketing loan 
program would have little aggregate effect on 
total payments. Only when an increase in the 
loan rate significantly increases the probability 
that countercyclical payments are zero because 
of large marketing loan payments will total 
expected payments increase with the loan rate 
increase. 
 
Raising the corn loan rate from $1.89 sig-
nificantly increases the probability that counter-
cyclical payments are driven to zero. This 
results in expected payments for corn increasing 
by 5 percent when the corn loan rate increases 
by 11 percent ($1.89 to $2.10) as one moves 
from policy Alternative 1 to Alternative 4. In 
contrast, expected payments for soybeans 
increase by only 1 percent when the soybean 
loan rate increases by 6.5 percent ($4.92 to 
$5.26) as one moves from policy Alternative 3 
to Alternative 1, suggesting that for soybeans 
the dollar-for-dollar trade-off adequately 
describes the current economic situation under 
this range of soybean loan rates and expected 
market prices.  
 
It is important to understand that the Table 
5 results are the average of simulated payments. 
To get more insight into the operation of the 
countercyclical program requires an understand-
ing of the entire distribution of payments. Recall 
that we generate 10,000 observations of price 
and yields and resulting payment levels. Figures 
1-8 show the probability distributions of 
payments under the countercyclical program 
under Alternative 1 for the individual crops. 
Figure 9 shows the probability distribution of 
total payments under the countercyclical 
program in Alternative 1. For the individual 
crops under Alternative 1, the probability of no 
payments from the countercyclical program 
ranges from 2 percent for oats to 30 percent for 
barley. There is roughly a 20 percent probability 
of no countercyclical payments for corn, cotton, 
rice, and wheat. This probability drops to 10 
percent for soybeans and to 5 percent for 
sorghum. However, total countercyclical 
payments (summing across the crops) are 
almost always greater than zero; there is a less 
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than 0.1 percent probability that total counter-
cyclical payments are zero. 
 
The distributions also show the maximum 
likely payments under the countercyclical 
payment program. Figure 2 shows that both 
the corn and the soybean countercyclical 
programs could each pay out more than $9 
billion, although the likelihood is low. This 
would be on top of any loan deficiency 
payments. The wheat countercyclical program 
could pay out more than $4 billion, and cotton, 
not quite $4 billion. The height of the bars in 
Figures 1–9 shows the probability of a certain 
level of payments. Given that a payment will 
occur, corn payments in the range of $1.2 to 
$6.0 billion are most likely. Soybean pay-
ments are most likely to fall between $500 
million and $5 billion. 
 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of pay-
ments across all crops under Alternative 1. As 
shown, the most likely scenario is a payment 
of around $8.2 billion. But there is some 
chance that total payments could exceed $20 
billion. This raises the question of compliance 
with World Trade Organization (WTO) limits. 
This revenue countercyclical program could 
be classified as non-crop-specific amber box 
spending given the recent U.S. Department of 
Agriculture ruling that 1998 market loss 
assistance payments are non-crop-specific 
 amber box payments. Total U.S. amber box 
spending is limited to $19.1 billion under 
WTO. Clearly, WTO  compliance is in 
question once marketing loan payments, 
expenditures on dairy and crop insurance, and 
the effects of the sugar and peanut quota 
program are added to the Figure 9 results. This 
suggests that the probability of exceeding the 
WTO limit under this program is substantially 
greater than under the House bill. 
 
PFC payments to soybeans depend on 
base acreage, base yields, and the PFC 
payment rate. Following the base for the 
countercyclical program, we use 1996 to 2000 
average acreage and production to establish 
the base for soybean fixed decoupled pay-
ments. The average acreage was 70.9 million 
acres. The average production was 2.65 billion 
bushels. Payments are assumed to be made on 
85 percent of the average production, follow-
ing the existing structure of PFC payments for 
other crops. If the soybean payment rate is 
$0.55 per bushel, then total PFC soybean 
payments are $1.237 billion. With a payment 
rate of $0.42 per bushel, soybean PFC pay-
ments are $0.945 billion. At a payment rate of 
$0.15 per bushel, soybean PFC payments 
would be $0.337 billion. To calculate the 
change in total soybean payments relative to 
the current farm program, simply add these 
payments to those reported in Table 5.  
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FIGURE 1. Distribution of barley countercyclical payments 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Distribution of corn countercyclical payments 
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FIGURE 3. Distribution of cotton countercyclical payments 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Distribution of oat countercyclical payments 
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FIGURE 5. Distribution of rice countercyclical payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Distribution of sorghum countercyclical payments 
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FIGURE 7. Distribution of soybean countercyclical payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8. Distribution of wheat countercyclical payments 
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FIGURE 9. Distribution of total countercyclical payments 
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